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Fragmented governance, the urban data ecosystem and
smart city-regions: the case of Metropolitan Boston
Rob Kitchina and Niamh Moore-Cherryb
ABSTRACT
Through an empirical focus on Metropolitan Boston, this paper examines the effects of territorial politics and fragmented
metropolitan governance on an urban data ecosystem and endeavours to enact a smart city-region. The fragmented
governance of Metro Boston reduces scales of economy and produces interjurisdictional data incompatibilities that limit
spatial intelligence, foster back-to-back planning and stifle the benefits of open data. Highlighted is the irony that in
order to address fragmented governance, there is a need for greater information-sharing, but that very activity is
stymied because of a deeply rooted localist agenda that resists more collaborative, metro-regional governance
arrangements.
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INTRODUCTION
In their paper on the drive to create smart cities, Kitchin,
Coletta, Evans, Heaphy, and Mac Donncha (2017a) note
that, despite significant enthusiasm and investment, actu-
ally existing smart urbanism continues to be partial and
fragmented, only moderately embedded within city admin-
istrations (see also Karvonen, Cugurullo, & Caprotti, 2018;
Shelton, Zook, & Wiig, 2015). They detail, from the per-
spective of a city administration, reasons why the smart city
has proven difficult to implement in practice, including:
entrenched organizational structures and ways of working;
internal politics and competing interests; constrained
resourcing and competing demands; a deficit of political
and public support; legacy systems and lack of mature, pro-
ven technological systems/solutions; and external resistance
and push-back. A further key factor is a fractured system of
political administration across city-regions.
This paper examines the effects of territorial politics
and fragmented metropolitan governance on an urban
data ecosystem and endeavours to enact a smart city-region.
There is a well-established literature on the territorial and
scalar politics of local and regional governance regimes of
cities and their effects on the operations of city adminis-
trations (Frug & Barron, 2008; Kreukels, 2003; Norris,
2017; Tewdwr-Jones, 2012). Increasingly, the city-regional
or metropolitan scale is considered the most appropriate to
drive urban and regional development in order to counter
the negative effects of multi-jurisdictional governance
(Ahrend, Farchy, Kaplanis, & Lembcke, 2014). The
form this takes can vary from highly institutionalized
forms of metropolitan governance, such as in Paris, to
more loosely based governance networks in cities such as
New York (Nelles, Gross, & Kennedy, 2018). The nature
of such administrative arrangements is shaped by preceding
events, local history and the existence of a ‘regional’ culture,
all of which can act as barrier to effective interjurisdictional
cooperation (Nunn & Rosentraub, 2007). However, while
attention has been paid to emerging notions of ‘smart gov-
ernance’, that is, using smart city technologies to manage
public administration and service delivery (Gil-Garcia,
2012; Goldsmith & Crawford, 2014; Ruhlandt, 2018;
Scholl & AlAwadhi, 2016), little attention has been paid
to the relationship between multi-jurisdictional governance
and the intra-urban data ecosystem.
City administrations, and other public agencies and
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), have long gen-
erated and used data about citizens, infrastructures and ser-
vices to help manage operations and govern. The use of
such data intensified with the introduction of digital sys-
tems throughout the latter third of the 20th century
(Kitchin, Lauriault, & McArdle, 2017b; Light, 2004).
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This has further deepened in the data-driven smart city age,
with digital data now routinely generated and used within
and across municipal departments to aid their work (Barns,
2016; Townsend, 2013). A plethora of digital technologies
is being deployed across different domains, including: e-
government systems, city operating systems, centralized
control rooms, digital surveillance, predictive policing,
intelligent transport systems, smart grids, sensor networks,
building management systems and civic apps. These sys-
tems generate big data – real-time, exhaustive, fine-grained
streams of data – that can be harnessed to provide urban
intelligence and reshape the practices and processes of pub-
lic administration (Townsend, 2013). Such reuse can be
internally facing; for example, providing intelligence on
the efficiency and effectiveness of operations and enabling
simulations of future scenarios (Goldsmith & Crawford,
2014). It can also be externally facing; for example, creating
civic apps and urban dashboards to improve quality of life
through the provision of real-time information about the
city (Kitchin, Lauriault, & McArdle, 2015). Increasingly,
public bodies are under pressure to share their data through
open data portals to enable citizens and companies to create
their own urban intelligence and derived products such as
apps (Barns, 2016, 2018). However, to date open data
have been piecemeal and largely restricted to administrative
data rather than more valuable, real-time operational data,
and often suffer from various quality issues (McArdle &
Kitchin, 2016).
Creating coherent, harmonized data sets becomes an
even greater challenge in a fragmented city-region com-
posed of multiple jurisdictions. Depending on the govern-
ance and legal structure of the city, public bodies may be
operating quite independently of each other, producing,
using and curating data in diverse ways with little incentive
to coordinate technical approaches or share data. Further,
infrastructure fragmentation can arise from choices and
constraints concerning technologies, protocols, standards
and contractors, and how they are implemented and evolve.
Depending on where one lives and works in a metropolitan
area, data-driven urbanism can be technically constituted
and administratively and operationally practised in quite
different ways, leading to variances in the delivery and qual-
ity of public services and, in some cases, compounding
existing inequalities. This paper examines the character
and consequences of fragmented governance structures
with respect to the urban data ecosystem of Metropolitan
Boston (henceforth Metro Boston). After detailing the
case study and methodology, it maps out the urban govern-
ance and data landscape of Metro Boston, details the issues
and consequences of fragmented governance, and the
implications for the emergence of a metropolitan data
commons.
CASE STUDY: METROPOLITAN BOSTON
Metro Boston is strongly polycentric in nature consisting of
101 administrative cities and towns (Figure 1) served by the
Metropolitan Area Planning Council (MAPC). According
toUSCensus Annual Population Estimates, the population
of Metro Boston was 3.2 million in 2013 (48% of the state
population) (MAPC, 2015). Cities and towns in Metro
Boston can vary substantially in population size with the
City of Boston the largest, estimated to be 653,103 in
2013, the next largest Cambridge, estimated to be
112,069, and 88 municipalities having less than 50,000
population (the smallest is just over 4000 residents).1
The complex political administrative geography of
Metro Boston is rooted in its historical development, hav-
ing evolved to include long-standing incorporated commu-
nities with strong-rooted, local identities, making it
different from other cities in the United States (Euncher,
2003; Horan, 2009; O’Connell, 2002). In the absence of
politically strong counties, cities and towns operate within
a system of ‘home rule’ in which ‘residents have the oppor-
tunity to create their own charters for the governance of
their community’ (Euncher, 2003, p. 25). Each of the
101 cities and towns has local autonomy, administers var-
ious forms of local governance and services, and can collect
property taxes. Cities are run either by a strong, elected
mayor and weak council of government, or by two forms
of city manager. Towns are ‘organized around open town
meetings, a representative town meeting, or elected select-
men or councillors’ (p. 26). Larger towns hire professional
staff to conduct day-to-day business; others rely on boards
and commissions made up of citizens serving in a part-time
or voluntary capacity. The economic and land-use profile of
cities and towns is diverse and thus their ability to raise
local tax income and deliver services varies enormously.
While not a unique situation, the lack of a regional gov-
ernment with executive powers means there is little direct
oversight and coordination of the 101 cities and towns.
Instead, they act largely independently of each other and
there is little history of cooperation. Indeed, mesoscale gov-
ernance is largely lacking in Massachusetts and there are
few general-purpose government bodies operating above
the local scale (Euncher, 2003). The exception is the
MAPC, although functionally it is advisory and provides
some consultancy and mapping services, but has no enfor-
cement powers. State-level agencies do deliver some ser-
vices that impact locally (e.g., state roads, state police)
and support services for public administration (e.g., Mass
IT, Mass GIS), but leave municipalities to govern locally
(Horan, 2009). Other governmental agencies that practice
local service delivery include: theMassachusetts Bay Trans-
port Authority (MBTA), which services all 101 towns and
cities; the Boston Regional Intelligence Centre, which
coordinates security policing across nine municipalities;
the Massachusetts Housing and Finance Agency
(MHFA), which provides affordable housing units and
finance to low-income households; and the Massachusetts
Water Resources Authority (MWRA), which provides
water and sewer services in full or part to 61 cities and
towns, most of which are in Metro Boston. Adding to
this complex governance landscape are special-purpose
governments – elected and appointed boards, and commis-
sions – that run specialized functions of government, and
non-governmental bodies (e.g., charities, foundations,
community groups). All these administrative entities have
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varying levels of autonomy and can have conflicting mis-
sions and practices.
These actors and institutions face significant dilemmas
when a new approach – in this case, smart urbanism, data-
driven approaches and open data – stand in opposition to
long-standing traditions and beliefs (Bevir & Rhodes,
2003). Metro Boston has the worst-case scenario for effec-
tive governance structures, ranking highly on the metropo-
litan power diffusion index and the state centralization
index (Hamilton, Miller, & Paytas, 2004). Characterized
as state-centric (Miller & Lee, 2011), local government
officials are twice more likely to interact with state officials
as among themselves. This situation is further complicated
by numerous political and business lobby groups, policy
think-tanks, and university research policy institutes and
centres that all seek to influence the policy agenda and
actions of government. Despite the functional urban area
stretching beyond and crossing municipal boundaries and
the widely acknowledged benefits of cooperation at the
city-regional scale (Henderson, 2015; Nelles, 2013), a
sense of ‘metro-phobia’ (Moore-Cherry & Tomaney,
2019) is clearly apparent.
This paper explores the impact of fragmented govern-
ance on the urban data ecosystem through 24 interviews/
focus groups with key stakeholders in the Metro Boston
region. The fieldwork took place in April and September
2016, with a particular focus on the cities of Boston, Cam-
bridge and Somerville, which border each other, and each
of which has started to embrace data-driven urbanism. In
total, 37 stakeholders were interviewed through 17 one-
on-one interviews, and six focus groups. Two public talks
were also recorded and transcribed with permission. The
interviewees included representatives from the cities of
Boston (including their open data, mapping, performance
metrics and New Urban Mechanics teams, and the Boston
Redevelopment Authority (BRA)2), Cambridge (open data
team) and Somerville (Somerstat), MAPC (Data Services
Department), the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
(Executive Office of Technology Services and Security),
workers in two data-focused companies, and academics in
Harvard, MIT, Northeastern, Boston University and
Emerson College. The public sector interviews were mainly
senior personnel in leadership positions, including the
heads of data teams and chief data/information officers,
as well as project staff. The academics were all lead inves-
tigators or key personnel working in laboratories and
teams researching aspects of data-driven smart urbanism
and had collaborated with government stakeholders in
the Metro Boston region. The one exception was an expert
on the legal and political administration of Massachusetts.
The interviews and focus groups took a conversational
guided approach (Patton, 1990). Typically, the interview
opened with a general conversation about the work of the
interviewee and their organization, and the extent to
which their work sought to enact data-driven/smart urban-
ism. It proceeded to discuss the specific work of particular
Figure 1. Metropolitan Boston.
Source: Lily Perkins-High and Tim Reardon, Metropolitan Area Planning Council (MAPC), Boston.
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programmes or projects and any salient issues and chal-
lenges. The questioning then explored issues of collabor-
ation across stakeholders in the region and the broader
urban data ecosystem and finished with an evaluation of
Boston as an ‘actually existing smart city’ (Shelton et al.,
2015). Since the empirical research is based on interviews
conducted in 2016, the analysis is limited to this period
and before and does not discuss any subsequent
developments.
A FRACTURED URBAN DATA ECOSYSTEM
Given the fragmented administrative geography of Metro
Boston, it is perhaps no surprise that it has a fractured
urban data ecosystem. This can be illustrated through a
comparison of Boston’s, Cambridge’s and Somerville’s
data-driven initiatives, selected because they all have active
data initiatives.
The City of Boston is by far the largest municipality in
the Metro Boston region by population and is highly data
driven. It is run by an elected mayor and its data initiatives
are principally organized through the Mayor’s Office or the
Department of Innovation and Technology. The city has
appointed a chief information officer and a chief data offi-
cer and has several specialist data teams (with over 35 staff),
including a New Urban Mechanics (NUM) that works
with communities, companies and universities to develop
civic apps and data-driven projects. In addition, other
departments have significant data capabilities through
their work programmes, and the city has ‘about 50 data
coordinators in departments… who are essentially tasked
with being the liaisons between the source data that
comes from these departments and agencies to the open
data portal’ (SB23).
Cambridge is the second largest municipality in Metro
Boston and home to Harvard University andMIT. It is run
by a city manager appointed by an elected council. It is sep-
arated from the City of Boston by the Charles River. Its
data initiatives are organized within the Department of
Information Technology, headed up by a chief information
officer. As of 2016, it had a relatively large geographical
information system (GIS) team (nine staff), but had only
recently appointed an open data coordinator and had
begun to build out its open data site, but it had not
embraced performance management and had relatively lit-
tle data analytics capabilities. It had no equivalent operation
to NUM, though it does participate in some university
research projects.
Somerville is the sixth largest municipality in Metro
Boston (population of 78,526 in 2013) and borders both
Cambridge and the City of Boston. It is run by an elected
mayor, now in his seventh term, who has consistently pro-
moted data-driven government, transparency and manage-
ment reform. Somerville’s key data initiatives are organized
through the Mayor’s Office for Innovation and Analytics.
Somerville was the first Metro Boston municipality to
embrace data-driven performance management. Somer-
Stat,3 a team of five people, employs performance analytics
on operational data to supervise the work of city
departments and guide budgetary planning, and also create
community data profiles and facilitate civic engagement
through its ResiStat programme.4 In 2016, it was still in
its infancy regarding open data provision.
While Boston, Cambridge and Somerville each have
their own approaches to managing and using data for the
purposes of city administration, they have very little inter-
action with each other with respect to data. They have no
formal programmes of sharing data or expertise with each
other and operate entirely independently, mirroring the
governance framework. As one interviewee noted, ‘we are
very nuclear [with] very little data sharing between munici-
palities in general’ (SB4a). They recognized that in other
parts of the country that the county scale would provide
structured coordination: ‘Boston, Cambridge and Somer-
ville each [has] their own separate data portal because
there isn’t a lot of services being provided in that umbrella
of the county where we might aggregate up’ (SB5c). The
predominant form of communication was through personal
networks rather than formalized relationships. As SB12
noted: ‘at one level, informally there is a lot of conversation
that goes on … there are also these really intense rivalries’.
The three municipalities are competing with each other for
investment, businesses and residents and want to have sys-
tems and governance that will give them a competitive
advantage, despite the widely documented productivity
and economic benefits of more cooperative approaches
(Ahrend et al., 2014). Even when similar initiatives are
being realized, municipalities might implement a different
version, which in turn might produce data with varying
ontologies that make it difficult to conjoin data sets. A
sharing tradition and culture is also missing within munici-
palities where ‘little fiefdoms’ (SB14) hinder collaborative
knowledge building ‘across those verticals’ (SB1b).
When interviewees were asked about data-driven gov-
ernance in the other 98 municipalities, the opinion
expressed was that there was relatively few initiatives. New-
ton and Lowell both had some experience in using per-
formance management analytics, and some departments
across all municipalities might be data-led and proficient.
In general, however, municipalities were thought to have
little resource and skills capacity, had very basic open data
sites, if at all, weakly coordinated data systems, and ad-
hoc data and digital strategies. One city official confessed
that he had ‘never been at a meeting where I have met
somebody from one of those smaller municipalities, it has
always been one of these big three’. One academic lamen-
ted that the urban data ecosystem ‘is totally balkanised’
(SB12).
To try to combat this fragmented landscape and pro-
vide some consistency and coherence across Metro Boston,
there are some cross-cutting data initiatives than span
municipalities, though each has its constraints. At the
state level, Mass GIS (Bureau of Geographic Information)5
provides a state-wide database of geospatial information
and a standardized set of ‘turnkey solutions’ (SB18) (pre-
prepared online GIS) for smaller municipalities that lack
the resources to build their own, and negotiate state-wide
procurement and software licensing of ESRI (provider of
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ArcGIS software) products. However, it does ‘very little in
terms of standardisation of local data sets across municipa-
lities’ (SB15). While Nelles et al. (2018) argue that the role
of the state in influencing and enabling coordination in
fragmented governance systems is critical, Mass GIS is a
rather limited intervention.
Initiated in 2008, New England StatNet is an initiative
administered by the Collins Center for Public Manage-
ment at the University of Massachusetts Boston to work
with municipalities to address resource and data skills
capacity issues and promote the use of data-driven per-
formance management approaches (Ward & Smith,
2013). It organizes regular workshops and seeks to identify
methods and best practices for using data to improve gov-
ernment services. It is a voluntary programme with limited
resources and has no authority to direct the work of cities
and towns. However, it could potentially play an important
advocacy function in building regional thinking if it could
identify some ‘rallying points around which interjurisdic-
tional cooperation can evolve’ (Nunn & Rosentraub,
2007, p. 207).
The MAPC is the only institution specifically focused
on the metro-region. It is a quasi-state planning agency
whose mission is to ‘promote smart growth and regional
collaboration’ (MAPC, 2015).6 As part of its mandate, it
works with the 101 municipalities in the metro-region to
produce a non-statutory, non-binding regional plan, facili-
tates shared procurement of services, and provides a stan-
dardized set of administrative and statistical data that
municipalities or their citizens (e.g., via the census) have
to provide to the state or federal agencies. It also provides
a set of data tools (e.g., online mapping), facilitated the
development of Commonwealth Connect (a shared non-
emergency services app provided by a private company),
has participated in programmes designed to harmonize
performance metrics and data standards, and performs
data-led planning consultancy for municipalities. However,
it has no authority and a weak formal mandate with respect
to municipalities. It possesses little administrative data
beyond that sought by the state/federal agencies and no
municipal operational data. Despite the potential that
this scale of governance might offer, such as in many
other contexts, it has not resulted in practice in the ‘devel-
opment of regional institutional frameworks for co-oper-
ation and co-ordination’ (Meijers & Romein, 2003,
p. 180).
The Boston Area Research Initiative set up in 2011 is
an inter-university initiative that works with the City of
Boston, and to a lesser degree with Cambridge and Somer-
ville, with respect to urban data and data issues. It seeks to
make available data sets and maps through its Boston Data
Portal7 that are useful for scholarly urban research, an
aspect of which requires harmonizing data from different
jurisdictions. Its primary remit is to conduct academic
and policy-led research using the City of Boston as a case
study, rather than to provide data services or act as a coor-
dinating data infrastructure for the metro-region.
In addition to public agencies and university initiatives,
several private companies (e.g., digital platforms, sharing
economy, utility companies, etc.), whose operations and
markets span cities and towns, are generating data across
the region that would be of benefit to public adminis-
tration. While some of these companies do have partner-
ships with municipalities (e.g., Waze is exchanging its
real-time traffic data for details of road construction and
closures with one city; SB1b), there is no centralized data
exchange for companies or municipalities.
ISSUES
The fractured urban data ecosystem in Metro Boston cre-
ates several related issues, with inefficiencies in organiz-
ation, uneven resourcing and lack of scales of economy
producing interjurisdictional data incompatibilities that
reduce spatial intelligence, foster back-to-back planning
and stifle the benefits of open data. This lack of coherence
and integration mirrors and is a product of fragmented gov-
ernance structures and a lack of ‘regional’ thinking, capacity
and culture (Hamilton, 2004). It inhibits synergistic metro-
politan development, widely acknowledged as a core issue
in the housing affordability crisis across the metro-region
(Glaeser, 2014), impacting on the attractiveness of the
city (Pike, Rodríguez-Pose, & Tomaney, 2016), and pre-
cluding the creation of a regional data economy.
Inefficiency, uneven resourcing and scale of
economy
There is little doubt that having 101 cities and towns in
Metro Boston working to develop data-driven governance
and services, create and maintain data infrastructures, and
produce open data creates a large duplication of effort
and inefficiencies in procurement. With the exception of
the City of Boston, given its size and relative wealth/pur-
chasing power, cities and towns lack the scale of economy
needed to leverage efficiency savings that could be gained
through collaboration and the pooling of efforts and bud-
gets. At the same time, there is highly uneven resourcing
and skills capacity across these cities and towns to develop
high quality, well-maintained data-driven systems and ser-
vices. As a consequence, every municipality is performing
suboptimally and some are being left behind, unable to rea-
lize the benefits that being data-driven might produce and
exacerbating pre-existing intraregional inequalities between
the central urban core and wider region (Sullivan, 2013).
As a state official noted: ‘Boston [has] more bandwidth
to do these sort of things and more data, just because of
the scale’ (SB1b). Cambridge and Somerville are following
a data-driven path, but their resourcing and programmes
are a fraction of the City of Boston. As one academic
detailed: ‘It is a small city problem.… Cambridge and
Somerville are doing some interesting things but they
don’t have a lot of capacity’ (SB17), although they are
well ahead of other cities and towns. While MAPC does
act in some cases as a broker for shared services and does
provide some open data and analytics functions, this falls
far short of what a collaborative, shared data ecosystem
might look like.
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Data incompatibilities
A fractured data landscape, resourcing deficits and lack of
scales of economy produces significant data issues with
respect to creating comparable cross-jurisdictional data
sets and gaining an understanding of the performance of
the metro-region as a whole. With the exception of data
required for state/federal reporting, each municipality is
free to generate whatever data it wishes and to create its
own data ontologies. This is compounded by a ‘lack of
standardised workflows… and no data standards’ (SB15)
across the metro-region. The result is data related to
administration and operations are unevenly generated,
and those data that are generated might be inconsistent
in nature across jurisdictions, meaning they cannot be con-
joined and used productively (O’Brien, 2015). However,
given the strength of the ‘home rule’ and autonomous tra-
dition within the metro-region, whether political actors
even recognize this problem is unclear as ‘their understand-
ing… is affected by the values and beliefs that they hold’
(DiGaetano & Strom, 2003, p. 372).
Reduced spatial intelligence and back-to-back
planning
The lack of harmonized data at the metro-region scale sig-
nificantly reduces spatial intelligence that would aid both
internal operations and planning, and also metro-region
wide infrastructure, economic development and spatial
planning. In effect, it is difficult to obtain the ‘big picture’
(SB1b) or to look at patterns of behaviour and the func-
tional territories of activities that span jurisdictions. As
SB1b continued: ‘there is no way to see if Boston reduced
its crime, but crime went up in Cambridge because it just
moved down the block’. Further, it reinforces back-to-
back planning, as it becomes difficult to assemble relevant,
equivalent data for the surrounding municipalities. During
the fieldwork both the City of Boston and Cambridge,
which share a border, were producing master plans inde-
pendently of each other. The vast majority of maps pro-
duced by the City of Boston do not include data relating
to the surrounding cities and towns, even though there is
an irregular-shaped border around Brookline and Cam-
bridge. Yet, what happens in its neighbouring administra-
tive areas directly affects its own fortunes. Figure 2 displays
the city’s climate ready map, an issue that has conse-
quences, and demands a coordinated strategy, across the
whole metro-region. Barely acknowledging that neigh-
bouring municipalities and their data ecosystem exist, and
failing to collaborate actively with them, is a very limited
and limiting position, and is contrary to trends in other
major metropolitan regions where the ‘neighbour effect’ is
recognized as of significant import (Brown, Eden, &
Bosetti, 2018).
Stifling the benefits of open data
In addition to limited spatial intelligence and limiting the
work of public administration, the lack of harmonized
data and a coherent metro-region data ecosystem stifles
the potential of open data. One of the key reasons for
opening data is to enable the value of public data to be
leveraged into products, whether that be non-for-profit
civic apps, or for-profit commercial apps (Pollock, 2009).
Indeed, open data are seen as a key ingredient in efforts
to create data economies. Moreover, many of these civic
apps seek to make the work of government transparent,
accountable and comparable, and also enable the public
to become more informed about issues and facilitate public
participation in the civic realm and foster social innovation
(Kitchin, 2014). Open data also encourages public agencies
to use such data to improve operational efficiencies and
productivity through evidence-informed monitoring and
decision-making, plus they can get valuable feedback
from outside parties. None of these benefits, however,
can be realized if there are systemic inconsistencies in
data ontologies across related data sets, a lack of open
data and disincentives to cooperation. Smart city technol-
ogies, such as civic apps, need to be able to scale across jur-
isdictions to create viable markets and revenue streams.
Developers do not expect to have to expend time and
energy hunting across 101 open data repositories for data,
talking to officials to get clarity, perform significant data
wrangling to get comparability, or produce endless bespoke
apps that cannot scale. Consumers expect to use one app
that relates to multiple jurisdictions. This is all but imposs-
ible in Metro Boston and seriously limits the opportunities
of leveraging open data.
TOWARDS A CITY-REGION DATA
COMMONS?
In many multi-jurisdictional cities, there are initiatives that
seek to provide coherence and integration across oper-
ational and strategic domains in the collective interest.
While in some places new regional or metropolitan scale
institutions are created, in other contexts effective partner-
ship networks operate without institutionalization (Feiock,
2009; Nelles, 2013). The creation of a citywide data com-
mons, a shared set of data tools and an aligned approach to
data-driven urbanism, can be facilitated by governance
structures that support and incentivise municipalities to
share data and work collaboratively. For example, in Los
Angeles, the county government provides a single open
data portal and services for all sixty municipalities within
its jurisdiction.8 In New York, the Mayor’s Office provides
a common agenda and platform for the five boroughs
through the open-data team and the Mayor’s Office of
Data Analytics.9 Similarly, in London (UK), all 32 bor-
oughs are mandated to share data with the Greater London
Authority (GLA) and have access and contribute to some
shared data services.10 In these cases, the municipalities/
boroughs continue to manage their own data infrastruc-
tures and digital services, but do so mindful that they are
operating within a larger framework, including a wider
spatial planning remit that requires alignment at the metro-
politan scale.
As noted, this is not the case in Metro Boston, where
the fragmented governance landscape is strongly embedded
and there is no perception that cooperation could yield
6 Rob Kitchin and Niamh Moore-Cherry
REGIONAL STUDIES
advantages (Hamilton, 2004). Such fragmentation is justi-
fied as providing checks and balances to accumulated
power, enabling diverse and creative approaches to policy,
and creating choice between locales and services. However,
there is a fine line between creative complexity and unruly
fragmentation (Euncher, 2003) and there are examples of
‘low risk’ cooperative models that do not diminish local
autonomy (Nunn & Rosentraub, 2007). The case of the
urban data ecosystem in Metro Boston demonstrates no
desire or expectation to simplify and align. While Mass
GIS, New England Stat Net, MAPC and BARI work to
paper over some of the cracks, they are relatively small
enterprises focused on planning, core indicators, perform-
ance management and academic policy research. Yet, sev-
eral respondents noted that there was a ‘tremendous
interest among citizens, among developers, among housing
advocates, among environmental folks, state agencies’
(SB15), and other stakeholders for metro-region data and
data tools.
While it is tempting to suggest deep political restruc-
turing through the introduction of regional government
as a solution to fragmentation, neither citizens nor munici-
palities have an appetite for a new form of regional admin-
istration (Horan, 2009; McCauley & Murphy, 2013;
O’Connell, 2002). This is especially the case where it
would be perceived to undermine local autonomy, as the
repeated rejection of regional metropolitan government in
Metro Boston over the past century has highlighted
(O’Connell, 2002). Similarly, a state-level mandate for
additional data or for collaborative shared data services
will run into stiff political resistance. As one public official
stated: ‘You can’t mandate to the municipalities, they will
just tell you to f*** off; it will never get through the legisla-
ture’ (SB15). Nonetheless, there is some evidence from
elsewhere that the state could play a critical role in the
economic development of the Boston metropolitan region
(Pike et al., 2016).
A more viable solution with respect to creating a metro-
politan data commons is a compact between the cities and
towns that would formalize data sharing and services across
Metro Boston. Such a compact would operate as a form of
‘competitive collaboration’ (Johnsen & Ennals, 2012),
working for the collective benefit of all cities and towns
by creating shared value by providing data infrastructures,
data sets and services for the metro-region that would aid
local planning and operations; provide a data commons
that would support a viable open data economy; act as a
point of contact for collaborations with industry, univer-
sities and civic groups; and provide a node around which
those interested leveraging urban data in diverse ways
could gather. This would not necessarily prevent them
from developing their own data-driven services and initiat-
ives that might provide competitive advantage in terms of
economic development and quality of life. In other
words, it would provide the basis for a more coordinated
and coherent urban data ecosystem.
This has been the approach adopted in Dublin (Ireland)
through the creation of Dublinked, the city’s open data site,
and Smart Dublin, a shared smart cities office.11 Like Bos-
ton, local government in Dublin is fragmented and there is
limited cooperation between authorities (Moore-Cherry &
Tomaney, 2019), and no city-regional government.12
However, the four Dublin authorities voluntarily agreed
to take a common approach to open data and smart cities
Figure 2. City of Boston, Climate Ready Boston Map.
Source: Screenshot, City of Boston, Boston Maps (http://boston.maps.arcgis.com/home/index.html).
Fragmented governance, the urban data ecosystem and smart city-regions: the case of Metropolitan Boston 7
REGIONAL STUDIES
in 2010, recognizing the scales of economy and shared
benefits of a single open data portal and a loosely coordi-
nated approach to data-driven urbanism (Coletta, Heaphy,
& Kitchin, 2019).13 This admittedly is a rare case of for-
malized collaboration and shared ownership and Smart
Dublin/Dublinked is presently the only mainstreamed,
long-term initiative of the four Dublin authorities.
MAPC is presently the agency nearest to performing
this role in Metro Boston. However, it does not operate
as a collectively owned, shared initiative of all cities and
towns (it is an independent regional planning agency)
and has no authority. Moreover, there is a sense that
MAPC is providing a minimum-level data and services
platform for those cities and towns which lack the capacity
to develop their own data infrastructure and analytics, with
the more capable municipalities largely taking their own
path. However, in its favour is that it already exists, has a
board that includes the chief elected officials of the 101
cities and towns, representatives from state agencies, and
citizen appointees of the governor, and citizens in Metro
Boston do favour ‘cooperative action’ between municipali-
ties (O’Connell, 2002). Such a compact would be strength-
ened significantly if other public agencies, such as MBTA,
MHFA, and MWRA were members, and if data-sharing
agreements at the city-regional level could be reached
with private companies.
Whether such a meaningful collaborative venture is
possible in practice is somewhat doubtful. The local auton-
omy of municipalities is well entrenched, with one city offi-
cial explicitly rejecting the Dublin model for this reason:
And in the case of Dublin you do need that unified portal of
all four. It is not like Boston and Cambridge. If I am inter-
ested in Boston, I am interested in Boston, or I am interested
in Cambridge, but in Dublin you kind of need that whole
picture.…We don’t care once you go across the river!
(SB4c)
Here, there was a perception that Dublin was a single city
split into four jurisdictions, whereas Boston was 101 separ-
ate, autonomous cities and towns. Another city official
rejected a collaborative approach on similar grounds.
But each of these cities have their very distinct identity. So,
Somerville has a very distinct identity. Cambridge, for sure,
has a very distinct identity. So to say that we can all coalesce
around one portal, may be a bit of a challenge because from a
cultural perspective they may all say, no we are different from
you and here is how we want to do it.
(SB6c)
Wheeler (2009) has argued that the emergence of strong
regional groups is challenging where local political actors
are reluctant to relinquish power as part of a rescaling.
This is clearly evident in Metro Boston where one
respondent (SB19) concluded that: ‘they have almost noth-
ing and what they have they are not going to give up’. With
respect to a regional data commons, this would translate as:
‘So, we will decide our own data policy because we can’t
decide anything else’ (SB19). One public official thus
noted that:
It requires a tremendous amount of labour to get commu-
nities to agree on [anything].… It is a city of cities and every-
body feels like they are a special snowflake and we can’t
possibly have the same system as the community next door
that is almost exactly the same size with almost exactly the
same demographics and land use.
(SB15)
City officials, some of whom recognized the value of feder-
ated data sets and shared services, expressed this view,
detailing reasons as to why they were unlikely to pursue a
shared approach. For example, one official professed to
be in favour of data standards that would create harmonious
metro-region data sets, but he also wanted to ‘make sure
that taxpayers dollars in [this municipality] go to helping
[this municipality’s] residents’ (SB18). The same intervie-
wee admitted that they were cautious about creating feder-
ated data sets because it would mean having to
‘compromise on your data standards and have a lot of meet-
ings about your data collection processes and business stan-
dards’, noting that, as the city adopts performance metrics
and statistics and analysis, ‘it is going to become harder to
cooperate with our neighbours’ (SB18) due to embedded
legacy data systems. In other words, the present rolling
out of different data systems across cities and towns,
along with a lack of data standards, is likely to make a
coherent urban data ecosystem increasingly difficult to
achieve.
Similarly, an official in another municipality argued that
‘most cities and towns… are really strapped for time and
resources and having to devote additional time to rejigging
our data collection processes so that they are the same as
their neighbours, I think it is a slog’ (SB22a). On the one
hand, the City of Boston has sufficient scale and a sophis-
ticated data infrastructure and suite of data services that
makes collaboration seem unnecessary. Plus, it was felt
that their inclusion meant the playing field was never
level with respect to collaboration: ‘Boston is always the
biggest dog in the room’ and ‘it is hard for other commu-
nities to have a say and feel validated as part of [any] pro-
cess’ (SB22b). On the other hand, not all cities and towns
have the resources to prepare and contribute data to a col-
laborative, shared data platform, or the political will or
capacity to change internal systems to be able to supply
data beyond what they presently provide to the state and
federal agencies. Even with some higher level technical
and analytical functions being centralized, becoming
data-driven requires an overhaul of local data management
practices and an investment in personnel. One city official
estimated that the cost of preparing its data for the open
data portal is up to US$150,000 a year in excess of usual
operating costs and it has a skilled team of data literate
staff. Some towns have semi-professional or voluntary
staff who have low levels of technical and data literacy
and tightly constrained budgets.
Thus, one academic concluded:
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I think if you went to talk to a lot of these small municipali-
ties, they would agree [a shared data platform] would make
sense but they would have no idea how they could possibly
think about this issue because what they are worried about
is their schools are not actually working and the police
force is falling apart and that is as much as they could handle,
and could you come back in a couple of years.
(SB19)
The result, as a private sector actor summarized, is there are
‘really well resourced folks that are afraid… to give up
resources, and then you have these folks who can’t even
think about it because it is so far down on their priority
list’ (SB16). In such a fractured and unevenly resourced
political landscape, the best one might presently be able
to hope for is the MAPC to expand its data role and
remit, and a set of incentives (e.g., additional funding
streams) or expectations (e.g., embedding in regulatory
and programmatic requirements) are put in place by the
state to encourage collaboration. Drawing on the experi-
ence in other fragmented metropolitan regions that have
highly competitive tendencies, there may be merit in begin-
ning with a sub-metropolitan flexible response that begins
with a ‘coalition of the willing’ and is fluid in nature (Hen-
derson, 2018). Another possibility is that the open data
movement and the private sector drives the creation and
adoption of standards across public bodies, as with the
open311 standard for citizen reporting of issues to admin-
istrations. This standard has been adopted by several Metro
Boston municipalities, though their front-end design, app
name and vendor varies (e.g., Citizens Connect, Common-
wealth Connect, SeeClickFix, Cambridge i-reports, Broo-
kOnline) (Offenhuber, 2015).
CONCLUSIONS
Metro Boston is somewhat of an unusual case – though by
no means unique – with respect to its urban governance
given the scale and depth of horizontal fragmentation
across municipalities and a lack of vertical integration.
Nonetheless, it does highlight the effects of fragmented
governance on the urban data ecosystem and data-driven
urbanism. As detailed, the fragmentation of administration
clearly has profound effects, creating inefficiencies in
organization, a lack of scales of economy and data incom-
patibilities that reduce spatial intelligence, foster back-to-
back planning and stifle the benefits of open data. Territor-
ial politics and a strongly embedded tradition of local
autonomy and belief in self-government, combined with
uneven resourcing and capacity, hinder collaboration gen-
erally and the creation of coherent metro-region data sets
and shared data services specifically. In this case, path
dependency is acting as a critical brake on potential innova-
tive approaches to urban governance and management.
This fragmentation also helps to explain, as hypoth-
esized by Kitchin et al. (2017a), the ‘adoption gap’ in the
uptake of smart city technologies, not just in Boston but
globally. Such technologies are designed to work at scale
and across jurisdictions, rather than being deployed in
bespoke form across cities. Fragmented governance splits
potential markets into a myriad of municipalities that
have different ethos, priorities, structures, resources,
finances, and legacy infrastructures and systems. While
each municipality could invest in a particular smart tech-
nology, it only becomes cost-effective and its utility and
value realized when it is operated at scale. Each of the
101 municipalities in Metro Boston investing in its own
intelligent transport system or city operating system or hav-
ing its own bikeshare scheme that is not interoperable
across the metro-region, for example, would make little
sense. Metro-wide adoption, at a sufficient scale of econ-
omy, can only be achieved through collaborative procure-
ment, which is difficult to realize in practice, particularly
given the structural differences between the municipalities,
many of which have a strong rural character despite being
in the metro area.
In the past, key infrastructures and services – water,
sewage, public transit, main roads – were extracted from
municipalities and placed into regional entities that
spanned them (e.g., in the Metro Boston case, MBTA,
MWRA). Such extraction would make sense with respect
to many new digital, data-driven infrastructures and ser-
vices. However, creating new regional agencies is politically
challenging. In the Metro Boston case, such a move would
be strongly resisted, especially since many of these infra-
structures and services relate to the core operational
business of municipalities that historically and culturally
have been highly autonomous. The MAPC does offer a
potential route to a more coherent urban data ecosystem
and a metro-region-wide approach to data-driven urban-
ism. However, the civic capacity required to do this is lack-
ing. Despite ‘intermunicipal partnerships [being] at the
heart of city-region governance capacity’ (Nelles, 2013,
p. 1355), building consensus and commitment with politi-
cal actors across different territories and scales is difficult.
In the United States, there is no incentive for political lea-
ders to engage in regional thinking, yet without it, the per-
formance of any city-regional institution will be severely
hampered (Hamilton, 2004). The Organisation for Econ-
omic Co-operation and Development (OECD) suggests
that the factors limiting effective multilevel governance sys-
tems include asymmetries of information, lack of capacity
and policy fragmentation, and that overcoming these chal-
lenges requires ‘instruments for revealing and sharing infor-
mation’ (Tomaney, 2016, p. 550). A smart and integrated
urban data ecosystem could fundamentally alter existing
intragovernmental and intra-municipal relationships and
perhaps this is the key problematic in a very conservative,
rigid, localist system.
This analysis highlights that the study of smart cities,
open data and data-driven urbanism needs to pay more
attention to the territorial politics of metropolitan develop-
ment. Far too often, critical analysis of smart cities has trea-
ted technologies and data as political, but have treated the
organization of city-regional governance in a relatively
benign, universal way. The present case study, and the
vast literature on urban governance, makes clear this is far
from being the case. As such, more research is required
Fragmented governance, the urban data ecosystem and smart city-regions: the case of Metropolitan Boston 9
REGIONAL STUDIES
to unpack the effects of multi-jurisdictional governance on
the adoption of technologies and practices. Such research
needs to examine the effects of different organizational
forms of urban governance regimes on urban data ecosys-
tems and digital infrastructures. In particular, it is necessary
to examine multilevel and functional governance regimes
with respect to different technologies and forms of urban
data. There is also a need to examine further the effects
of data-driven technologies on the forms and practices of
municipal government, and how these are ameliorated by
governance regimes in order to make sense of how the
‘actually existing smart city’ (Shelton et al., 2015) is
unfolding.
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